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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship between money balance
as a ratio of income and the Treasury bill rate for the period of 1965:02 to 2007:01, and, in
turn, use the relationship to obtain welfare cost estimates of in￿ ation. Using the Johansen
(1991, 1995) technique, we estimate a log-log speci￿cation and a semi-log model of the above
relationship. Based on the ￿ts of the speci￿cations, we decided to rely more on the welfare
cost measure obtained under the log-log money demand model. Our estimates suggest that
the welfare cost of in￿ ation for South Africa ranges between 0.34 percent and 0.67 percent of
GDP, for a band of 3 to 6 percent of in￿ ation. Thus, it seems that the SARB￿ s current in￿ ation
target band of 3-6 percent provides quite a good approximation in terms of welfare.
KEYWORDS: Cointegration; Money Demand; Welfare cost of In￿ ation
JEL Classi￿cation: E31; E41; E52
1 Introduction
Studies on welfare cost of in￿ ation have been the focus of extensive theoretical and empirical analyses
in both the recent and more distant past. Using Bailey￿ s (1956) consumer surplus approach, as
well as, the compensating variation approach, Lucas (2000) provided estimates of the welfare cost
of in￿ ation for the US economy based on annual data for the period of 1900 to 1994. Lucas￿(2000)
calculations, based on the log-log money demand speci￿cation, indicated that reducing the interest
rate from 3% to zero would yield a bene￿t equivalent to an increase in real output of about 0.009(or
0.9 percent).
Serletis et al. (2004), in their study dealing with the welfare cost of in￿ ation for Canada and
the United States, however, came up with much smaller ￿gures, compared to Lucas (2000), when
they used recent advances in the ￿eld of applied econometrics to estimate the interest elasticity
of money demand. Unlike Lucas (2000), Ireland (2007), however, showed that a semi-log money
demand speci￿cation ￿ts the post 1980 US data better than a log-log econometric model. Based
on the estimation of the semi-log money demand model, Ireland (2007) found that a 10 percent
rate of in￿ ation when compared to price stability would imply a welfare cost of 0.21 percent of
income. This ￿gure, though lower than that of Lucas (2000) and Serletis et al. (2004), was in line
with Fisher￿ s (1981) ￿ndings of 0.30 percent and a value of 0.45 percent obtained earlier by Lucas
(1981).
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1Given that welfare cost estimates di⁄er remarkably based on alternative money demand func-
tions, we in this study aim to ￿rst derive a money demand function that appropriately de￿nes the
South African money market, and then, in turn, use it to obtain welfare cost estimates of in￿ ation.
For this purpose, we look at quarterly data over the period of 1965:02 to 2007:01, and given the
econometric problems of non-stationary data, use the Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration tech-
nique to obtain a long-run money demand relationship. Note measures of welfare cost of in￿ ation,
are important for any economy, but more so in a country like South Africa, where the central bank
targets in￿ ation.1 To put it di⁄erently, we try and investigate how substantial are the welfare costs
of in￿ ation under the current in￿ ation target zone of 3 to 6 percent pursued by the South African
Reserve Bank2, and if there is a need to rethink the band of the target in terms of the welfare cost
of in￿ ation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst attempt to measure the welfare cost of
in￿ ation for the South African economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief summary of the
theoretical issues regarding the estimation of the welfare cost of in￿ ation, while, Section 3 and 4,
respectively, discusses the data and presents the estimation of the log-log and the semi-log money
demand speci￿cations. Section 4 also calculates the welfare cost estimates for the South African
economy. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Foundations
As indicated by Lucas (2000), money demand speci￿cation is vital in determining the appropriate
size of the welfare cost of in￿ ation. Lucas (2000) contrasts between two competing speci￿cations
for money demand. One, inspired by Meltzer (1963), relates the natural logarithm ofm; a ratio of
money balances to nominal income, and the natural logarithm of a short-term nominal interest rate
r. Formally, this can be expressed as follows:
ln(m) = ln(A) ￿ ￿ ln(r) (1)
where A>0 is a constant and ￿>0 measures the absolute value of the interest elasticity of money
demand. Another speci￿cation, adapted from Cagan (1956), links the log of m to the level of r via
the following equation:
ln(m) = ln(B) ￿ ￿r (2)
where B>0 is a constant and ￿>0 measures the absolute value of the semi-elasticity of money
demand with respect to the interest rate.
By applying the methods outlined in Bailey (1956), Lucas (2000) transformed the evidence
on money demand into a welfare cost estimate. Note Bailey (1956) described the welfare cost of
in￿ ation as the area under the inverse money demand function, or the ￿consumers￿ s surplus￿ , that
could be gained by reducing the interest rate to zero from an existing (average or steady-state)
1See Ludi and Ground (2006) for a great compilation on the history of monetary policy of South Africa.
2Though, the in￿ation target is for the CPIX, we use the CPI in￿ation for our calculations, mainly due to the fact
that the CPIX series does not exist for the whole sample period used, given that South Africa￿ s decision to move to
an in￿ation targeting regime only began in February of 2000. In addition, the correlation between the CPIX in￿ation
and the CPI in￿ation over the period of 1999:02 to 2007:02 was found to be 0.81. So given this high correlation and
the fact that the average rates of the CPI and the CPIX in￿ation were relatively close, speci￿cally 5.12 and 6.23
percent respectively, studying the welfare cost of CPI in￿ation is very similar to studying the welfare cost for an
in￿ation in the CPIX.
2value. So if m(r)is the estimated function, and  (m)is the inverse function, then the welfare cost







m(x)dx ￿ rm(r) (3)
As seen from Equation 3, obtaining a measure for the welfare cost amounts to, integrating under
the money demand curve as the interest rate rises from zero to a positive value to obtain the
lost consumer surplus and then deducting the associated seigniorage revenue rm to deduce the
deadweight loss.
Since the function m has the dimensions of a ratio to income, so does the function w. The
value of w(r); represents the fraction of income that people needs, as compensation, in order to
be indi⁄erent between living in a steady-state with an interest rate constant at r or an identical
steady state with an interest of close or equal to zero. Given this, Lucas (2000) shows that when
the money demand function is given by (E1) or is m(r) = Ar￿￿, the welfare cost of in￿ ation as a













1 ￿ (1 + ￿r)e￿￿r￿
(5)
As can be seen from (Equations 4) and (Equations 5), an estimate of the interest elasticity of
money demand is crucial in evaluating the welfare cost of in￿ ation, and, hence, we ￿rst need to
obtain the long-run relationship between the ratio of money balance to income and a measure of
the opportunity cost of holding money, captured by a short-term nominal interest rate.
3 Data
In this study, we use quarterly time series data from the second quarter of 1965 (1965:02) to the
￿rst quarter of 2007 (2007:01) for the South African economy, which, in turn, are obtained from the
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Quarterly Bulletin and the International Financial Statistics
of the IMF. The variables used in this study are the money balances ratio (rm3), generated by
dividing the broad measure of money supply (M3)3 by the nominal income (nominal GDP), and
short term interest rate, in our case proxied by the 91 days Treasury bill rate (tbr).4 All series,
except for the Treasury bill rate are seasonally adjusted. Further, for the estimation of the log-log
speci￿cation both the ratio of money balances and the Treasury bill rate are transformed into their
logarithmic values, and are denoted by lrm3 and ltbr, respectively.
3Though, in the literature, welfare costs of in￿ation has generally been obtained using a narrow de￿nition of
money, we chose M3, since we believe that a broad monetary aggregate captures the role of money better than a
narrowly de￿ned version of the same. In addition, the ratio of M3 to GDP was found to be least volatile. Finally,
the choice was further motivated to take account of possible ￿nancial innovations that have taken place in the South
African economy over the period of our concern.
4We also use the percentage change at seasonally adjusted annualized rates of the CPI to obtain the rate of
in￿ation, and, hence, the real rate of interest. See below, for further details.
34 Empirical Results
As is standard in time series analysis, we start o⁄ by studying the univariate characteristics of the
data. In this regard, we performed tests of stationarity on our variables (lrm3, ltbr and tbr) using
the Augmented￿ Dickey￿ Fuller (ADF) test, the Dickey-Fuller test with GLS Detrending (DF-GLS),
the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test and the Phillips- Perron (PP) test. As
can be seen from Table 1, the variables were found to follow an autoregressive process with a unit
root, as the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected for the variables, expressed in levels
for the ADF, the DF-GLS and the PP tests, while for the KPSS test, the null of stationarity was
rejected. As the variables were found to be non-stationary, it paved the way for the Johansen test
for cointegration between lrm3 and ltbr in (1) and lrm3 and tbr in (2).
At this juncture it is important to point out a possible concern in the analysis. These statistical
tests which ￿rst analyzes the stationarity and then checks for cointegration between lrm3 and ltbr
in (1) and lrm3 and tbr in (2), requires, as Ireland (2007) puts it, a ￿somewhat schizophrenic view of
those data￿since, in a linear framework, the analysis of the log-log model requires ltbr to follow an
autoregressive process with a unit root, while the identical analysis of the semi-log model requires
tbr to be I(1). Bae (2005) actually provides a detailed discussion of the case in which both the
models can be estimated under the common assumption that tbr follows an autoregressive unit root
process, with the log-log speci￿cation being viewed as a non-linear relationship between lrm3 and
tbr and the semi-log model viewed as a linear framework for the same two variables. As in Ireland
(2007), we follow Anderson and Rasche (2001), by treating both as linear functions linking lrm3
and ltbr in (Equations 1) and lrm3 and tbr in (Equations 2) and, thus, putting the two models on
￿equal footing ex ante￿ .
But, before we tested for cointegration, a test for the stability of the VAR model, including a
constant as an exogonous variable was performed. Given that no roots were found to lie outside
the unit circle for the estimated VAR based on 4 lags under both the log-log and the semi-log
speci￿cations, we conclude that the VARs are stable and suitable for further analysis.5 Note the
choice of 4 lags was based on the unanimity of two alternative lag-length criteria, namely the
Schwarz information criterion and the Hannan-Quinn Information criterion for the log-log money
demand speci￿cation, and the Sequential Modi￿ed LR test statistic for the semi-log money demand
model. Before we proceed further, it is important to point out that though four criteria, namely
the Final Prediction Error, the Akaike Information, the Schwarz Information and the Hannan-
Quinn Information, overwhelmingly suggested the choice of two lags for the semi-log speci￿cation,
no cointegration could be detected using the Johansen test with two lags. However, as has been
reported below, the cointegration test based on 4 lags, suggested by the Sequential Modi￿ed LR
test statistic, picked up one cointegrating relationship.
Once the issues of stability and the optimal lag length were settled, we tested for the cointegrat-
ing relationship based on the Johansen (1991, 1995) approach. For this purpose, we included four
lags in the VAR, and allowed the level data to have linear trends, but the cointegrating equations
to have only intercepts. Based on the Pantula Principle, both the Trace and the Maximum Eigen
Value tests, showed that there is one stationary relationship in the data (r = 1) at 5 percent level
of signi￿cance for both the log-log and the semi-log speci￿cations. The results have been reported
in Tables 2 and 3.6
5Tests indicating the stability of the VAR have been suppressed to save space. However, they are available from
the authors upon request.
6As in Ireland (2007), we also used the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) test for cointegration. However, unlike Ireland
(2007), the test could not detect any cointegrating relationship between the chosen variables. Hence, the results of
4Given one cointegrating relationship (r = 1);the Johansen (1991, 1995) procedure gives the max-
imum likelihood estimates of the unrestricted cointegrating relation ￿
0
Xt:Even if the unrestricted
￿ is uniquely determined, depending on the chosen normalization, ￿ is not necessarily meaningful
from an economic point of view. Therefore, an important part of long-run cointegration analysis is
to impose (over-) identifying restrictions on ￿ to achieve economic interpretability (Hendry et al.
2000).
As we are more interested in the relationship between the money balance ratio and interest rate,
for both speci￿cations, lrm3 was restricted to unity. Given that we have only one cointegrating
vector, the normalizing restriction on lrm3 is enough to exactly identify the long-run relationship.
However, we encountered two serious econometric problems with this restriction. First, the restric-
tion was not binding. Secondly, the adjustment coe¢ cient of lrm3 was insigni￿cant under both the
speci￿cations. Imposing an additional zero restriction on the adjustment coe¢ cient of lrm3 did
ensure binding restrictions, but at the cost of suggesting that the ratio of real balance to income was
in fact exogenous and we should not be normalizing on lrm3. Given this, we decided to normalize on
the interest rate variable, i.e., ltbr for the log-log speci￿cation and tbr for the semi-log speci￿cation.
Further, with the adjustment coe¢ cients on lrm3 still being insigni￿cant in both the models, we
restricted them to zero, and obtained binding restrictions.7 Note with lrm3 now treated as the
right-hand side variable, weak exogeneity of the same is what should be expected. The adjustment
coe¢ cients of ltbr and tbr were negative and signi￿cant, with them correcting for 6.9 percent and
8.08 percent of the disequilibrium in the next period, respectively. Based on the above restrictions,
the obtained long-run relationship for the log- log speci￿cation is as follows:
ltbr = ￿5:275983 ￿ 4:789793(lrm3) (6)
[￿3:87971]
While for the semi￿ log model, the relationship is given by:
tbr = ￿0:171261 ￿ 0:454711(lrm3) (7)
[￿3:88877]
Figures 1 and 2 depict the cointegrating relationships under the log-log and the semi-log spec-
i￿cations respectively. As can be seen, the residuals of the two cointegrating equations are mean-
reverting around zero and are stationary, which implies that the estimated cointegrating relations
are appropriate.8 Note what we have in equations (6) and (7) are actually the inverse of the
money demand functions, with rate of interest as the dependant variable. Alternatively, we can
view equations (6) and (7) as long-run rules for the treasury bill rate. Whatever we choose to call
these equations is not important to our cause, but it is the values of the coe¢ cients of these two
estimated cointegrating relationships, that are more relevant. The obtained interest elasticity, in
absolute term, equals to 0.2088 and the interest semi elasticity is equal to 2.1991, both of which
the test have been suppressed to save space. They are, however, available upon request.
7Note the value of the LR test statistics for binding restrictions, both long- and short-run, for the log-log and the
semi-log speci￿cations respectively, were ￿2(1)=0.0036 (0.9522) and ￿2(1)= 0.4041 (0.5250), where the numbers in
the parenthesis indicates the probability of committing a Type I error.
8Diagnostic tests on the residuals revealed that there is no autocorrelation in both the log-log and the semi-log
speci￿cations.
5are obtained by taking the reciprocal of the coe¢ cients corresponding to lrm3 in equations (6) and
(7) respectively. Importantly, the signs of the interest rate elasticity and semi-elasticity, in both
the speci￿cations, adhere to economic theory. Based on these two, elasticities, we are now ready to
calculate the welfare cost of in￿ ation as outlined in Lucas (2000), and described above in equations
(E4) and (E5).
The estimates of the intercept and slope coe¢ cient reported under the log-log speci￿cation imply
values of A = 0.3323 and that of ￿= 0.2088, while for the semi-log speci￿cation the values of B
= 0.6862 and that of ￿ = 2.1991.9 Plugging these values into the corresponding formula for the
welfare cost measures, given by equations (E4) and (E5) respectively, and using the fact that the
average real rate of interest10 over this period was equal to 7.70 percent, so that a zero rate of
in￿ ation would also imply a nominal rate of interest equal to 7.70 percent￿we obtain the baseline
value of w under price stability. Naturally then, a value of r = 10.70 corresponds to a three percent
rate of in￿ ation, while, when r = 13.70, the economy experiences a six percent in￿ ation, and so on.
So the welfare costs of in￿ ation are evaluated by subtracting the value of w at an in￿ ation equal to
zero from the value of the same at a positive rate of in￿ ation.
Given above in Table 4 are the measures of the welfare costs of in￿ ation, under the log-log and
the semi-log speci￿cations for the in￿ ation rates of 3, 6, 10 and 15 percent, respectively. For an
in￿ ation rate of 3 percent, the cost of in￿ ation under both the log-log and the semi-log speci￿cations
are 0.34 percent of GDP. However, as the in￿ ation rate increase from 6 percent to 15 percent, the
cost of in￿ ation in the log-log model ranges between 0.67 percent of GDP and 1.56 percent of GDP,
while for the semi-log money demand function the welfare cost varies between 0.76 percent of GDP
and 2.41 percent of GDP.11 So, the two speci￿cations provide clearly di⁄erent measures of the cost
of in￿ ation with the semi-log function imposing greater welfare loss on the economy as the in￿ ation
rate increases beyond the 3 percent mark.
So the pertinent question now is: Which one of the two inverse money demand speci￿cations
represents the money market of South Africa better? To resolve this issue we look at couple aspects
of the two alternative money demand models: First, we compare simple linear and exponential
plots of the relationship between tbr and lrm3 with the scatter plot of these two variables, and;
second, we look at the R2 and Adjusted R2 values of these two ￿ts of the data.12 In sum, we
basically analyze the goodness of ￿t for the two speci￿cations. As can be seen from Figure 3,
it is impossible to choose between the two models based on the linear and the exponential plots
of the data. However, with the R2 and the Adjusted R2 values of the inverse money demand
relationship captured by the log-log speci￿cation being higher than the corresponding values of the
semi-log model,13 we decided to rely more on the results from the former. In addition, recall that
although there existed overwhelming evidence that suggested the choice of two lags for the semi-log
9Note the values for A and B are easily obtained by realizing that: A = [exp(-5.27598)] raised to the power of
0.208819, and B = [exp(-0.171261)] raised to the power of 2.199149.
10Note, as in Ireland (2007), we de￿ne the real rate of return to be equal to the di⁄erence between the nominal
interest rate and the in￿ation rate, where the in￿ation rate is obtained as the percentage change in the seasonally
adjusted series of the CPI. In addition, the real rate of interest was found to be stationary based on the ADF, the
DF-GLS, the KPSS and the PP tests of unit roots.
11Note that these obtained values for the welfare cost of in￿ation are comparatively higher than those reported in
Fischer (1981), Lucas (1981), Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2007) for the US economy.
12Note given that the plots are based on tbr and ltbr, the linear trend ￿tted to the data gives us the semi-log
inverse money demand relationship, while, the exponential trend when taken logs will yield the log-log inverse money
demand model.
13The R2 and the Adjusted R2 values of the log-log model are 0.1517 and 0.1466 respectively, while those of the
semi-log function are 0.1443 and 0.1391 respectively.
6speci￿cation, no cointegration could be detected using the Johansen test with two lags. We, thus,
had to use 4 lags, based on the Sequential Modi￿ed LR test statistic, to obtain a stable long-run
money demand relationship. Based on this, one can, perhaps, argue that the semi-log speci￿cation
is relatively less reliable, in comparison to the log-log model, as to depicting a true picture of the
South African inverse money demand, over the period in concern. Alternatively, the bottom line
of all this discussion is that, we tend to believe, that the welfare cost measures obtained from the
log-log inverse money demand relationship is more appropriate. This implies that the welfare cost
of in￿ ation for South Africa ranges between 0.34 percent and 0.67 percent of GDP, for a band of 3
to 6 percent of in￿ ation.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses the Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration technique to ￿rst obtain an appropriate
long-run money demand relationship for the South African economy and then, in turn, deduce
welfare cost estimates based on the inverse money demand function, as outlined in Lucas (2000).
For this purpose, we look at quarterly data over the period of 1965:02 to 2007:01 and estimate a
log-log function and a semi-log speci￿cation. Based on the ￿ts of the speci￿cations, we decided to
rely more on the welfare cost measure obtained under the log-log inverse money demand model.
Our estimates suggest that the welfare cost of in￿ ation for South Africa ranges between 0.34 percent
and 0.67 percent of GDP, for a band of 3 to 6 percent of in￿ ation. Though, these measures are way
higher when compared to the estimates observed in the literature, they are reasonably low. Based
on our estimates, we can conclude that the SARB￿ s current in￿ ation target band of 3-6 percent
provides quite a good approximation in terms of welfare, at least in comparison to a Friedman-type
de￿ ationary rule of zero nominal rate of interest.
However, it is important to point that our welfare cost estimates merely measures the distortion
in the money demand due to positive nominal interest rates. But as argued by Dotsey and Ireland
(1996), in a general equilibrium framework, rise in the in￿ ation rates can distort other marginal
decisions and, hence, can negatively impact both the level and the growth rate of aggregate output.
In addition, as pointed out by Feldstein (1997), interactions between in￿ ation and a non-indexed
tax code can add immensely to the welfare cost of in￿ ation. Given these two additional sources of
in￿ ation costs, there is no denying the fact that one can achieve, possibly, larger gains by reducing
the in￿ ation target below 3 percent, the lower limit of the in￿ ation target band.
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Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
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                                                                                                              Trace Statistic  
r=0 r=1  18.86965*   15.49471   0.0149 
r=1 r=2  0.111350  3.841466  0.7386 
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
                                                                                                     Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic 
r=0 r=1   18.75830*    14.26460    0.0091 
r=1 r=2   0.111350   3.841466    0.7386 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
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Prob.** 
                                                                                                             Trace Statistic  
r=0 r=1   19.67238*   15.49471   0.0110 
r=1 r=2   0.197347   3.841466   0.6569 
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
                                                                                                   Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic 




   0.0068 
 




  0.6569 
 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 2. Cointegrating relationship of the Semi-Log Specification 
 
 
Table 4: Welfare Costs of Inflation 
Inflation Rate  Log-Log  Semi-Log 
0.03 0.0034  0.0034 
0.06 0.0067  0.0076 
0.10 0.0108  0.0143 
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Figure 3. Inverse Money Demand Function of South Africa, 1965:02-2007:01. 
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